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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 000382

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X1

TAGS: [AEMR](#) [ASEC](#) [AMGT](#) [PTER](#) [CASC](#) [KSAC](#) [KHLs](#) [KVPR](#) [MU](#) [EAC](#)

SUBJECT: EMBASSY MUSCAT EAC - 03/15/2006

REF: A. LEGATT/RSO E-MAIL DTD 03/15/2006

[B](#). RSO/DSCC E-MAIL DTD 03/15/2006

[C](#). MUSCAT 0357

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission William R. Stewart.
Reason: 1.4(c).

Summary

[1](#). (SBU) The DCM chaired a meeting of the core Emergency Action Committee (EAC) on March 15 to assess the Embassy's security posture prior to the local weekend, and in light of recent unsubstantiated threat reporting (references A and B). Noting no substantive changes in the local security environment since the last meeting, members agreed that the Embassy's already heightened security posture and force protection condition (FPCON) remain appropriate. End Summary.

Security Environment

[2](#). (SBU) On March 15, the DCM chaired a meeting of the core EAC to assess the Embassy's security posture prior to the local weekend, and in light of recent unsubstantiated threat reporting (references A and B). The meeting opened with a discussion of the local security situation, which the EAC continued to characterize as stable. P/E did, however, comment on a significant increase in internet message board traffic related to a March 14 Israeli raid on a Palestinian prison, for which the bulk of blame was being specifically directed at the U.S. and U.K. governments. As a result, members agreed on the need to closely monitor public sentiment.

Unsubstantiated Threat Information

[3](#). (SBU) The meeting continued with a review of unsubstantiated threat information received by the Embassy on March 15 from Legal Attache Abu Dhabi (reference A) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (reference B). Specifically, both reported that on March 8, the American Citizen (Amcit) wife (residing in Ohio) of Omani national Hilal Hasan Ali JAAFAR (residing in Oman) alleged to an FBI agent that JAAFAR threatened to "bomb" the U.S. Embassy in Oman (NFI). It was further reported that on March 15, JAAFAR's wife told another FBI agent following up on the aforementioned allegation that JAAFAR threatened to "kill anyone" from the Embassy that "attempted to take his son away." RSO noted that FBI officials question both the emotional stability and credibility of JAAFAR's wife (e.g., she previously admitted to fabricating information to advance her personal agenda). NOTE: This incident is the latest in a series of events connected with an emotionally charged custody battle involving JAAFAR, his wife, and their three Amcit children, one of whom is residing with JAAFAR in Oman. Details of the custody case to be reported septel. END NOTE.

[4](#). (SBU) Given the nature of the information available, members of the EAC do not assess it to constitute an imminent threat to Embassy Muscat or its personnel. However, members agreed to seek immediate assistance from the Royal Oman Police in determining the veracity of the threats allegedly made by JAAFAR, as well as on specific precautions for any "Welfare and Whereabouts" visits to JAAFAR's Amcit son by Consular personnel. Members also convened a special meeting of the Visas Viper Committee related to this case (to be reported septel).

Residential Security

[5](#). (SBU) Prior to concluding the meeting, OMC (USDR) raised the issue of significantly increased pedestrian and vehicular traffic around two Embassy-leased residences, currently

occupied by DOD personnel, citing growth of a local business. Accordingly, members agreed to formally request assistance from the Muscat Municipality in an attempt to control commercial traffic in the affected area. NOTE: Both aforementioned leases are scheduled for summer 2006 termination. END NOTE.

EAC Conclusion

16. (S/NF) Upon careful consideration of all alleged threat information above, the EAC concluded that there have been no substantive changes in the local security environment since the last meeting held on March 11 (reftel C), and agreed that the Embassy's already heightened security posture and FPCON remain appropriate. Embassy Muscat remains acutely aware of the need to monitor both the regional and local security and threat environments, and is prepared to take the necessary countermeasures should changes to either occur. DCM, P/E, MGT, RSO, ARSO, SIMO, CONS, OMC (USDR), and Duty Officer participated in the meeting.
BALTIMORE